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1. Introduction
Any theoretical semantics for programming languages as well as any based on logic tool for checking or proving
correctness of a given specification has to assume amodel of arithmetic. This should be the model closely approximating an
arithmetic of an actual executed program. Nevertheless, most of such theoretical tools use arithmetic based on the standard,
infinite model. This is in contrast with a real situation of a computing device. In its computation a computer may access only
a finite part of the set of natural numbers. If it exceeds this part then the overflow phenomenon occurs. This is a clear sign
that the computer arithmetic is not the arithmetic of the standard model but rather of its finite initial segment. Of course,
we cannot arbitrarily specify the size of this segment. This depends on a used implementation and on a size of the accessible
memory. Itmay even change during an execution of a program if newmemory is added. But at eachmoment of the execution
there is a fixed, finite bound on this segment. Thus, if we want to develop a sound semantics for programming languages, it
is important to study theories of finite initial segments of the set of natural numbers.
In his seminal paper [5], Hoare postulates developing an axiomatic system for proving the properties of programs. He
notes there that the arithmetic implemented in programs is always an arithmetic with a finite number of integers. Thus,
there will be always a maximal value, denoted by MAX, which satisfies the following axiom ∀x(x ≤ MAX). On the other
hand, the standard, infinite model for arithmetic satisfies the axiom ¬∃z∀x(x ≤ z). It follows that in order to properly
describe the arithmetic of real computers and executed programs one should not consider the classical infinite model and
its theory. Rather, we should look for new theories andmodels, possibly even notwithin Tarski style semantics if theywould
better reflect the properties of the computer-like arithmetic.
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Hoare proposes three different methods to model this problem depending on an implementation of the overflow
operation. If the result of an operation (in the standardmodel) exceedsMAX then either it may be undefined or onemay put
in its place the value ofMAX or onemay adapt the arithmeticmoduloMAX. In this paperwe investigate arithmetics with the
first two options. The first one may be modeled by relations which are graphs of partial functions, the second one is simply
modeled by modifying operations from the standard model of arithmetic. In modeling such computer-like arithmetic one
should not specify what is the precise value ofMAX. Indeed, this valuemay change between two runs of the same program if
they are executed on two differentmachineswith different sizes of registers for keeping integers. Even during one execution
of the program onemay change this value by allocating some additional memory for performing arithmetic operations with
arbitrarily large integers. Having this in mind, we do not investigate a theory of one finite model (which is also quite trivial).
Instead, we examine which sentences are true in almost all finite models for arithmetics or, in other words, all sufficiently
large finitemodels.We examine the properties of the arithmetic in which a bound on a size of amaximal integer is not fixed.
On the contrary, we assume that this bound can be always enlarged if needed. Although a semantical intuition for theories
of sentences true in almost all finite models, called sl-theories, are based on finite models for arithmetic, it should be noted
that many of our results show that we can think about sl-theories as theories of nonstandard models of arithmetic with a
maximal element.We investigate closer this correspondence in the case of a characterization of infinitemodels for sl-theory
of addition.
Summing up, our approach may have some applications in at least two areas of theoretical computer science. The first
one is the investigation of semantics of formal languages, the second one, proving properties of programs.
In our approach we follow the investigation started by Mostowski in [16,17]. Further results can be found in [11,10,18,
13,20,19]. For the description of the state of knowledge so far we refer to the survey [9]. Other results on logical properties
of finite arithmetics which did not directly influence our work may be found e.g. in [1,14,23].
We consider families of finite models being initial segments of a given structure A with the universe being the set of
natural numbers N. For such a family FM(A) we define its sl-theory, sl(A), as the set of sentences which are true in all
but finite number of models from FM(A). One of our main results concern Presburger arithmetic of addition. We give an
axiomatization of its sl-theory, sl(PresbAr), and a full characterization of its possible extensions. In particular, we obtain
infinitely many decidable complete extensions of sl(PresbAr). We also establish a relation between models for Presburger
arithmetic and models for sl(PresbAr). Namely, we show that each model for sl(PresbAr) is an initial segment of a model
for Presburger arithmetic. Conversely, each infinite initial segment with a maximal element of a nonstandard model for
Presburger arithmetic constitutes a model for sl(PresbAr).
We also investigate complete extensions of the sl-theory of addition and multiplication. We show that their complexity
is at least∆3 in the arithmetical hierarchy and we construct a complete extension which has exactly this complexity.
This paper is divided into six sections. In the next section we fix the notation and introduce the main concepts. In
particular, we define the operation sl, a fundamental notion in our paper. In the third section we give several examples
illustrating the operation sl and prove some of its basic properties. We discuss also a relation between the operation sl and
the reduced product operation. In the next section we consider complete extensions of the theory sl(A). We prove that
every such extension is determined by an infinite subset of natural numbers as well as by an ultrafilter on natural numbers.
In the fifth section we study the theory sl((N,+)). We give an axiomatization of this theory and prove that even though
theories Th((N,+)) and sl((N,+)) are different, there is a close relation between their models. In the sixth section, we
study complete extensions of the theory sl((N,+,×)).
2. Basic definitions
2.1. Basic model theoretical concepts
In [16] Marcin Mostowski proposed to consider a theory of initial segments of standard models of arithmetics. In this
approach one replaces an actual infinity of a standardmodelwith the family of finitemodels,which can be seen as potentially
infinite. In [16,17], he introduces fundamental concepts and describes the semantical strength of such a theory. In [16]
Mostowski considered the case of arithmetic with the vocabulary convenient for formalizing the syntax of the language.
Later studies focused on properties of arithmetics with other sets of relations. Further results appeared in [13,18,19], see
also a survey [9].
LetA be a structure having as a universe the set of natural numbers, i.e.,A = (N, R1, . . . , Rs, f1, . . . , ft , a1, . . . , ar), where
R1, . . . , Rs are relations on N, f1, . . . , ft are operations (not necessarily unary) on N and a1, . . . , ar ∈ N. We will consider
finite initial fragments of these structures. Namely, for n ∈ N, byAn we denote the following structure
An = ({0, . . . , n}, Rn1, . . . , Rns , f n1 , . . . , f nt , an1, . . . , anr , n),
where Rni is the restriction of Ri to the set {0, . . . , n}, f ni is defined as
f ni (b1, . . . , bni) =

fi(b1, . . . , bni) if f (b1, . . . , bni) ≤ n
n if f (b1, . . . , bni) > n
and ani = ai if ai ≤ n, otherwise ani = n. We will denote the family {An}n∈N by FM(A).
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Let us note that the signature ofAn is an extension of the signature ofA by one constantMAXwhich denotes themaximal
element ofAn.
Throughout the paper, we work with the language of first order logic. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xp) be a formula and b1, . . . , bp ∈ N.
We say that ϕ is satisfied by b1, . . . , bp in all sufficiently large finite structures of FM(A), denoted by FM(A) |Hsl ϕ[b1, . . . , bp],
if there is k ∈ N such that for all n ≥ kAn |H ϕ[b1, . . . , bp]. Consequently, a sentence ϕ is true in all sufficiently large finite
structures of FM(A) if there is k ∈ N such that for all n ≥ kAn |H ϕ.
By Th(A) we denote the set of all sentences true in A. We say that structures A and B are elementarily equivalent and
denote it by A ≡ B if Th(A) = Th(B). For a class of structures K , by Th(K) we denote the set of sentences true in all
structures fromK , that is Th(K) =A∈K Th(A). By sl(A)we denote the set of sentences true in all sufficiently large finite
structures of FM(A) i.e.,
sl(A) = {ϕ : ∃k∀n ≥ kAn |H ϕ}.
Sometimes we will use the set
sl−(A) = {ϕ ∈ sl(A) : ϕ is of the signature ofA}.
So, sl−(A) contains all sentences of sl(A) in which the constant MAX does not appear.
Every structure A such that |A| = N determines a theory sl(A). This establishes a correspondence between structures
and their sl-theories. This correspondence will be denoted by sl.
In some places of our paper we will need the notion of FM-representability introduced in [16]. A relation R ⊆ Np is
FM-representable in FM(A) if and only if there exists a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xp) such that for all a1, . . . , ap ∈ N,
(a1, . . . , ap) ∈ R if and only if FM(A) |Hsl ϕ[a1, . . . , ap]
and
(a1, . . . , ap) ∉ R if and only if FM(A) |Hsl ¬ϕ[a1, . . . , ap].
We say that a formula ϕ is a logical consequence of a formula ψ , denoted as ψ |H ϕ, if for an arbitrary structure A and
a valuation a¯ if A |H ψ[a¯] then A |H ϕ[a¯]. Similarly, a sentence ϕ is a logical consequence of a set of sentences T if for an
arbitrary structure A if A |H T then A |H ϕ. If ϕ is a logical consequence of ψ and ψ is a logical consequence of ϕ then
we say that ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent. For a set of sentences T , by Cn(T )we denote the set of all sentences which are
logical consequences of T .
By an ∃n-formula we mean a formula of the form ∃x¯1∀x¯2 . . .Q x¯nψ , where x¯i, for i = 1, . . . , n, is a sequence of variables,
ψ is a quantifier free formula and Q is a universal or existential quantifier depending on whether n is even or odd. So, an
∃1-formula is a formula of the form ∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xnψ , where ψ is a quantifier free formula. An ∃2-formula is one of the form
∃x1 . . . ∃xn∀y1 . . . ∀ymψ , where ψ is a quantifier free formula. Similarly, by a ∀n-formula we mean a formula of the form
∀x¯1∃x¯2 . . .Q x¯nψ , where ψ is a quantifier free formula. Occasionally, we will also say that a formula ϕ is Qn, for Q ∈ {∀, ∃}
when ϕ is logically equivalent to a Qn formula.
Wewill also use a hierarchy of arithmetical formulas (see e.g. [7]). An occurrence of a quantifier Q in a formula ϕ is called
bounded if it is of the form Qx ≤ tψ , where t is a term of a language (note that ∃x ≤ tψ should be read as ∃x(x ≤ t ∧ ψ)).
Sometimes, we use an operation of bounding a quantifier Qxψ to a term t which results in a formula Qx ≤ tψ . By a bounded
arithmetical formula or∆0-formulawe mean an arithmetical formula in which all quantifiers are bounded.
Finally, we define classes Σn and Πn as we did with classes ∃n and ∀n but as a starting point we take ∆0-formulas not
just quantifier free ones. By a∆n-formula we mean a formula equivalent in the standard model of arithmetic to aΣn and a
Πn formula.
By ∃≥nxϕ we denote a sentence stating ‘‘there exist at least n elements satisfying ϕ’’. Similarly, by ∃=nxϕ we denote a
sentence stating ‘‘there exist exactly n elements satisfying ϕ’’.
2.2. Filters and products
One of our aims is to investigate the properties of sl(A) for different structuresA and to compare them with properties
of theories of structures obtained by applying some limit operations on the family FM(A) such as, for example, the reduced
product.
We briefly recall the reduced product construction. Let I be a set. A nonempty family F of subsets of I is called a filter on
I if it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. if X, Y ∈ F then X ∩ Y ∈ F ,
2. if X ∈ F and X ⊆ Y ⊆ I then Y ∈ F .
Each subset A of I determines a filter FA = {B ⊆ I : A ⊆ B}. Every filter of that form is called principal. We also say that
FA is generated by A. In the case of I being finite, each filter is principal. A filter which is not principal is called non-principal.
For an infinite I , an example of a non-principal filter is the so-called Frechet filter, FrI = {X ⊆ I : I − X is finite }.
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A filter F on I is called ultrafilter on I if it satisfies the following condition
3. for arbitrary X ⊆ I we have: X ∈ F if and only if I − X ∉ F .
It is easy to see that each principal ultrafilter is generated by a one-element subset.
Let F be a filter on I and {Ai}i∈I be a family of structures of the same signature. Assume that for i ∈ I Ai = (Ai,
Ri1, . . . , R
i
k, f
i
1, . . . , f
i
m, a
i
1, . . . , a
i
n). We define relation∼F on
∏
i∈I Ai as follows:
(xi)i∈I ∼F (yi)i∈I if and only if {i ∈ I : xi = yi} ∈ F .
It is easy to see that the relation∼F is an equivalence relation on the set∏i∈I Ai. We denote the set of equivalence classes
by
∏
i∈I AiupslopeF and an equivalence class of x by [x]. On this set we define relations Rj, for j = 1, . . . , k and functions fl, for
l = 1, . . . ,m as follows:
([(x1i )i∈I ], . . . , [(xpi )i∈I ]) ∈ Rj if and only if {i ∈ I : (x1i , . . . , xpi ) ∈ Rij} ∈ F ,
where p is the arity of the relations Rij and
fl([(x1i )i∈I ], . . . , [(xri )i∈I ]) = [(f il (x1i , . . . , xri ))i∈I ],
where r is the arity of the functions f il . The structure∏
i∈I
AiupslopeF =
∏
i∈I
AiupslopeF , R1, . . . , Rk, f1, . . . , fm, [(ai1)i∈I ], . . . , [(ain)i∈I ]

is called a reduced product of the family of structures {Ai}i∈I with respect to the filter F .
Every formula of the form (χ1 ∧ χ2 ∧ · · · ∧ χn) → χ0, where χi for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, is an atomic formula, is called a
basic Horn formula. Horn formulas are constructed from basic Horn formulas by a repeated application of quantification and
conjunction. The following result is well known (see [2] or [3]).
Proposition 2.1. Let {Ai}i∈I be a family of structures of the same signature,F a filter on I and ϕ a Horn formula. If {i ∈ I : Ai |H
ϕ[x1i , . . . , xpi ]} ∈ F then
∏
i∈I AiupslopeF |H ϕ[[(x1i )i∈I ], . . . , [(xpi )i∈I ]].
If F is an ultrafilter on I then the reduced product
∏
i∈I AiupslopeF is called an ultraproduct. In such a case we have Łoś
Theorem, (see [15]).
Theorem 2.2 (Łoś, [15]). Let {Ai}i∈I be a family of structures of the same signature, F an ultrafilter on I and ϕ a formula. We
have: ∏
i∈I
AiupslopeF |H ϕ[[(x1i )i∈I ], . . . , [(xpi )i∈I ]] if and only if {i ∈ I : Ai |H ϕ[x1i , . . . , xpi ]} ∈ F .
3. Basic properties of sl
3.1. Logical properties
Obviously, for an arbitrary structure A each sentence true in all structures from FM(A) belongs to sl(A), i.e.,
Th(FM(A)) ⊆ sl(A). Let us also observe that the set of sentences sl(A) is closed under logical consequence.
Fact 3.1. Let ϕ,ψ be sentences. If ϕ ∈ sl(A) and ϕ |H ψ then ψ ∈ sl(A). In particular sl(A) is closed under modus ponens.
Using the above fact one can prove that the theory sl(A) is consistent and, hence, has a model. Indeed, assume that there is
a sentence ϕ such that ϕ and¬ϕ can be deduced from sl(A) in first order logic. All the logical axioms are in sl(A). So, ϕ and
¬ϕ are in sl(A), by Fact 3.1. This is a contradiction.
Observe that every sentence of the form ∃≥nx(x = x) belongs to sl(A). Thus every model for sl(A) is infinite. This allows
one to prove the following.
Theorem 3.2. For every structureA, sl(A) is not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Assume that sl(A) is finitely axiomatizable. Then, there exists a sentence ϕ which is an axiomatization of sl(A). This
means that every model for ϕ is a model for sl(A). Thus every model for ϕ is infinite. But ϕ ∈ sl(A) which means that ϕ is
true in a structureAn if n is big enough. So, ϕ has a finite model. A contradiction. 
3.2. Limit properties of sl
The upper and lower limits of a sequence of sets {Xn}n∈N are defined as follows (see e.g. [8]):
lim inf
n→∞ Xn =

n∈N

k∈N
Xn+k, lim sup
n→∞
Xn =

n∈N

k∈N
Xn+k.
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Obviously, lim infn→∞ Xn ⊆ lim supn→∞ Xn. If the equality holds then we say that the sequence of sets {Xn}n∈N converges
and its limit is equal to the upper or lower limit.
We can characterize the set sl(A) in terms of a limit of a sequence of sets of sentences.
Fact 3.3. sl(A) = lim infn→∞ Th(An).
The following can be also easily seen.
Fact 3.4. For each sentence ϕ, ϕ is consistent with sl(A) if and only if ϕ ∈ lim supn→∞ Th(An).
Corollary 3.5. sl(A) is a complete theory if and only if the sequence (Th(An))n∈N converges.
Let us remark that the limit/colimit operations on theories/specifications are frequently used in the information fusion
theory to be fusion operators of diagrams of specifications (see [12,24]). In the samewaywemay consider the limit operator
sl to be a natural, new formalization of the fusion operation.
Examples. Now we compare Th(A) and sl(A) on some concrete examples of structuresA.
3.1. Let A be a structure in the empty signature. So, the theory sl(A) is simply the theory of infinite structures with one
constant. Hence it is a complete theory. Moreover, sl−(A) = Th(A).
3.2. LetA = (N,≤) orA = (N, <). In these cases sl(A) is the theory of an infinite linear discrete ordering with the first and
last elements, i.e., sl(A) = Th((ω + ω∗,≤,m)) or sl(A) = Th((ω + ω∗, <,m)), respectively, where m is the last element,
ω is the order type of natural numbers and ω∗ is its reversed version. Thus the theory sl−(A) is also a complete theory,
however sl−(A) ≠ Th(A) (A |H ∀x∃y(x < y) and obviously ∀x∃y(x < y) ∉ sl−(A)).
3.3. LetA = (N, S), where S is the successor function. As in the previous example the theory sl(A) is a complete theory. By
using the Ehrenfeucht–Fraisse games, it can be proved that sl(A) = Th((ω + ω∗, S∗,m)), where m is the last element and
S∗(x) = y holds if y is an immediate successor of x or x = y = m. In this case also the theories sl−(A) and Th(A) differ from
each other. For example, a ∀1 sentence ∀x(S(x) ≠ x) belongs to Th(A) but does not belong to sl(A).
3.4. LetA = (N,+). Let ϕ be the following sentence: ∃x(x+ x ≠ MAX ∧ x+ x+ 1 = MAX). In this case neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ
belongs to sl(A). So, sl((N,+)) is not complete. Section 5 will give the full description of complete extensions of sl((N,+)).
3.5. LetA = (N,×). In this case sl(A) is not complete. In [13] there is an example of a sentence ϕ which is true inAn if and
only if n is a square of a natural number. So, ϕ ∉ sl(A) and ¬ϕ ∉ sl(A).
The above examples show that, in general, the relation between Th(A) and sl(A) is rather weak. Even ∀1 sentences from
Th(A)may not belong to sl(A) (see Example 3.3). However we can state the following.
Fact 3.6. If ϕ is aΣ1-sentence and ϕ ∈ Th(A) then ϕ ∈ sl(A).
Fact 3.7. If ϕ is aΣ2-sentence without function symbols and ϕ ∈ Th(A) then ϕ ∈ sl(A).
3.3. sl and relations between structures
As the above examples show, in general, sl(A) is not a complete theory. This corresponds with our next observation
stating that there is no relation between the relation of elementary equivalence of models for arithmetic and the equality
relation between theories of sufficiently large finite structures.
Proposition 3.8. There are structuresA andB such thatA ≢ B and sl(A) = sl(B).
Proof. Let R and S be linear orderings onN of the typeω+ω∗ andω+ω+ω∗, respectively. Obviously, structures (N, R) and
(N, S) are not elementarily equivalent. But as we can observe sl((N, R)) = sl((N, S)). Let T = Th((ω+ω∗, <))∪ {∃≥nx(x >
MAX) : n ∈ N} ∪ {∃≥nx(x < MAX) : n ∈ N}. Using Ehrenfeucht–Fraisse games we can prove that every two models for T
are elementarily equivalent. So, T is a complete theory. Moreover, it is easy to verify that T ⊆ sl((N, R)) ∩ sl((N, S)). 
Fact 3.9. There are structuresA andB such thatA ∼= B and sl(A) ≠ sl(B).
Proof. Let R be the divisibility relation on N. Let f ∈ NN be defined as follows:
f (x) =

2x if x is prime
x
2
if x = 2p, where p is prime
x in other cases.
Let S be the image of R in f , i.e., S = {(f (x), f (y)) : (x, y) ∈ R}. We put A = (N, R, 0, 1) and B = (N, S, 0, 1). Obviously,
A ∼= B.
Now, we write a sentence ϕ such that ϕ ∈ sl(A) but ϕ ∉ sl(B). The sentence states that there exists a number x such
that it divides only itself and zero and is not divided by any number different from 1 and x. It has the form
ϕ := ∃x∀y[(P(x, y)↔ (x = y ∨ y = 0)) ∧ (P(y, x)↔ (x = y ∨ y = 1))].
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In models An ∈ FM(A) a witness for x can be an arbitrary prime number bigger than n/2. On the other hand in models
Bn ∈ FM(B) any number b which behaves in Bn like a prime number is of the form 2p. Thus, the first conjunct of ϕ does
not hold for y = p. So, sl(A) ≠ sl(B). 
In the above proof we gave an example of structuresA andB such thatA ∼= B and sl(A) ≠ sl(B). It may seem strange
that the operation sl is not invariant under isomorphism. However, let us note that in the definition of this operation an
important role is played by the standard ordering on N. This ordering is not definable in the structures considered in the
proof of Fact 3.9.
3.4. sl and reduced products of finite structures
The family of cofinite subsets ofN forms a Frechet filter FrN onN.Wewill denote it by Fr. So, Fr = {X ⊆ N : N−X is finite}.
It is natural to expect that there exists some relation between sl(A) and the theory of
∏
n∈NAnupslopeFr. As the following
examples show such a relation, in general, is not very strong.
Examples. 3.6. IfA is a structure of the empty signature then obviously Th(
∏
n∈NAnupslopeFr) = sl(A).
3.7. LetA = (N,≤). As we observed sl(A) is the theory of the linear discrete ordering with the first and last elements. On
the other hand
∏
n∈NAnupslopeFr is not a linear ordering: sequences 1010 . . . and 0101 . . . are incomparable. Indeed, it is a dense
lattice with the least and greatest elements.
3.8. Let A = (N, <). In this case∏n∈NAnupslopeFr is also a nonlinear ordering having continuum many minimal and maximal
elements. So, in this case, the theories sl(A) and Th(
∏
n∈NAnupslopeFr) are different.
3.9. Let A = (N,+). In this case the theory Th(∏n∈NAnupslopeFr) is also different from sl(A) because the formula ϕ(x, y) :=∃z(x + z = y) which defines a linear ordering in the second theory does not define such an ordering in the first one (see
Example 3.7 above).
3.10. LetA = (N,×). It is not difficult to see that there are divisors of zero in∏n∈NAnupslopeFr. It is enough to take sequences
(an)n∈N, (bn)n∈N such that, for every n ∈ N, anbn = 0; for infinitely many natural numbers k, ak ≠ 0 and for infinitely many
natural numbers k, bk ≠ 0. Obviously, the sentence ∀x∀y(x×y = 0→ (x = 0∨y = 0)) belongs to sl(A) (observe that zero
is definable in both theories by the same formula). So, again the theory of the reduced product of finite structures is not the
same as sl(A).
3.11. LetA = (N, |). In this case sl(A) contains axioms of the theory of partial ordering which is not dense but∏n∈NAnupslopeFr
is a dense partial ordering.
The above examples show that the theory of a reduced product of finite structures is generally quite different from the
theory of sentences true in sufficiently large finite structures.
However, by Proposition 2.1, we have the following.
Proposition 3.10. If ϕ is a Horn sentence and ϕ ∈ sl(A) then ϕ ∈ Th(∏n∈NAnupslopeFr).
Every non-principal ultrafilter on N contains the Frechet filter Fr. Thus, by Łoś theorem, we have the following.
Proposition 3.11. For an arbitrary non-principal ultrafilter U on N,
∏
n∈NAnupslopeU is a model for sl(A).
4. Complete extensions of sl(A)
As follows from Proposition 3.11, an arbitrary non-principal ultrafilter U on N determines a complete extension of the
theory sl(A). It is the theory Th(
∏
n∈NAnupslopeU). Now, we state something more.
Definition 4.1. Let X ⊆ N be infinite. By sl-theory ofA restricted to X we mean the following set of sentences
slX (A) = {ϕ : ∃k∀n ≥ k(n ∈ X ⇒ An |H ϕ)}.
Let us observe that if we would allow a finite set X in the above definition then slX (A)would be the set of all sentences
of the language.
When X is a cofinite set then slX (A) is just sl(A) but in general slX (A) could contain more sentences. Obviously for an
arbitrary set of natural numbers X the set of sentences slX (A) has logical properties similar to that of sl(A), in particular,
the properties expressed in Fact 3.1. Wewill show that any complete extension T of sl(A) can be characterized by a suitable
X .
Theorem 4.2. For anyA and any consistent extension T of sl(A) there exists X such that T = slX (A).
Proof. Let T = {ϕi}i∈N be an extension of sl(A). Let (ψi)i∈N be a sequence of all sentences consistent with T . Moreover,
assume that every sentence which is consistent with T occurs in (ψi)i∈N infinitely many times. We construct a sequence of
integers (xi)i∈N as follows:
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• x0 = 0
• xi+1 = min{n : xi < n andAn |H ψi ∧k≤i+1 ϕk}.
Since T is a consistent extension of sl(A) and, for each i, ψi is a sentence consistent with T then, for each i, the sentence
ψi ∧ k≤i+1 ϕk is consistent with sl(A). By Fact 3.4 this sentence has arbitrary large finite models in FM(A). Therefore,
(xi)i∈N is a well defined infinite sequence of integers. Moreover, we have
• xi < xi+1, for i ∈ N,
• for all i ∈ N, for all j ≥ i,Axj |H ϕi.• if ψ is a sentence consistent with T then for arbitrary i there is xj > i such thatAxj |H ψ .
From the above properties it follows that for X = {xi}i∈N, slX (A) = T . Obviously, T ⊆ slX (A). On the other hand, if
ϕ ∉ Cn(T ) then ¬ϕ = ψi, for infinitely many i. For all such i ∈ X ,Axi |H ¬ϕ so ϕ ∉ slX (A). 
From the proof of the last theorem we can deduce an additional statement about complexity of X . Indeed, X is recursive
in the set of consequences of T . If T is a complete theory the latter set is T itself. So, we have the following.
Corollary 4.3. ForA and any complete extension T of sl(A) there exists X, which is recursive in T and satisfies T = slX (A).
The following fact immediately follows from the definition and Łoś theorem.
Fact 4.4. For an arbitrary infinite set X ⊆ N and non-principal ultrafilter U on N such that X ∈ U, slX (A) ⊆ Th(∏n∈NAnupslopeU).
Let us observe that if T is a complete extension of sl(A) and X is a set constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.2 then for
any non-principal ultrafilter U such that X ∈ U , T = Th(∏n∈NAnupslopeU). So, we have the following.
Proposition 4.5. For any complete extension T of sl(A) there exists a non-principal ultrafilter U such that T = Th(∏n∈NAnupslopeU).
From Propositions 3.11 and 4.5 we have
Corollary 4.6. sl(A) =U⊃Fr Th(∏n∈NAnupslopeU), where the intersection is taken over all ultrafilters U containing Fr.
5. Theory of addition in finite structures
In this section we will examine the sl-theory of the arithmetic of addition. So, till the end of this section A denotes the
structure (N,+).
We give an axiomatization of sl(A), characterize its complete extensions and establish a model theoretic relation to
Th(A).
5.1. Presburger arithmetic
It is well known that the theory PresbAr = Th((N,+)), called Presburger arithmetic, is axiomatizable. There are several
axiomatizations of PresbAr. One of them is the following:
A1. ∀x∀y(x+ y = y+ x),
A2. ∀x∀y∀z(x+ (y+ z) = (x+ y)+ z),
A3. ∀x∀y∀z(x+ z = y+ z ⇒ x = y),
A4. ∃x∀y(y+ x = y),
A5. ∀x∀y∃z(x = y+ z ∨ y = x+ z).
It follows immediately from axioms A3 and A4 that there is exactly one element a such that for all b, b+ a = b. For this
unique element we may introduce a new constant 0 and use it in the next axioms.
A6. ∀x∀y(x+ y = 0⇒ x = 0 ∧ y = 0),
A7. ∃x(x ≠ 0 ∧ ∀y(y ≠ 0⇒ ∃z(x+ z = y)).
It can be proved from the above axioms that there is exactly one element with the property stated in Axiom A7. For this
element we introduce a new constant 1. The above axioms allow us to prove the following statements (often considered as
axioms).
B1. ∀x(0 ≠ x+ 1).
B2. ∀x(x ≠ 0⇒ ∃y(x = y+ 1)).
Finally, for every natural number n > 1 we have the following axiom
A8n. ∀x∃y[x = y+ · · · + y  
n
∨x = 1+ (y+ · · · + y  
n
) ∨ · · · ∨ x = (1+ · · · + 1  
n−1
)+ (y+ · · · + y  
n
)].
Let us denote the above axiomatization of PresbAr by AxPresbAr; see the axiomatization given in [4] for a comparison.
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It can be deduced from AxPresbAr that the formula ∃z(x+ z = y) defines a relation which is a discrete linear order. The
element 0 is the first element of this ordering and 1 is its immediate successor. So, each model for AxPresbAr is ordered in
a canonical way. In the following we use the notation ‘‘x ≤ y’’ for a formula which defines this linear ordering.
Let, for n > 0, x ≡n y denote the following formula
∃z(z + · · · + z  
n
+ x = y ∨ z + · · · + z  
n
+ y = x)
For every n > 0 it follows fromAxPresbAr that the formula x ≡n y defines a congruence relationwith respect to the addition
operation.
The following is a classical result about Presburger arithmetic
Theorem 5.1 (Presburger, [21], See Also [22]). PresbAr is decidable.
The proof of the above theorem goes by the method of elimination of quantifiers. It is proved that every formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is effectively equivalent to a boolean combination of the following basic formulas: t = u, t ≤ u and t ≡n u,
where n ∈ N and t, u are arbitrary terms with variables among x1, . . . , xn. If ϕ is a sentence then t and u are constant terms
and the true value of basic formulas can be decided. This gives an algorithm for deciding Presburger arithmetic.
5.2. An axiomatization of sl((N,+))
Obviously sl(A) is not the same as PresbAr. Moreover, even sl−(A) does not coincidewith Presburger arithmetic because
the sentence ∀x∃y(x < y) does not belong to sl−(A). On the other hand we will observe that sl(A) is quite close to PresbAr.
In what follows we will present a modification of the axiomatization of Presburger arithmetic such that it axiomatizes
sl(A). By considering some examples of models we will argue that all the modifications and additions to PresbAr are indeed
necessary. In the remaining part of this section we show that this is an axiomatization of sl(A). While proving this we will
establish a relation between models of slPresbAr and models of PresbAr.
Now, we present slPresbAr. The first two axioms of PresbAr: A1 and A2 are also axioms of slPresbAr. The axiom A3 does
not belong to sl(A) so we need to take its modified version
A3∗. ∀x∀y∀z((x+ z = y+ z ∧ x+ z ≠ MAX)⇒ x = y).
The axiom A3∗ is, roughly speaking, a relativization of A3 to the set of elements different from MAX. The need for this
modification is obvious when we realize that A3 is not true in finite models from FM(A), thus it does not belong to sl(A).
Axioms A4–A7 and A8i, for i > 1, are included in slPresbAr. Finally, we need to add a group of additional axioms which
characterize MAX.
A9∗. ∀x(MAX+ x = MAX),
A10∗. ∃x(x ≠ MAX ∧ x+ 1 = MAX),
A11∗i . 1+ · · · + 1  
i times
≠ MAX, for i ∈ N.
So, slPresbAr = {A1,A2,A3∗,A4,A5,A6,A7,A9∗,A10∗}∪{A8i: i ∈ N∧ i > 1}∪{A11∗i : i ∈ N}, where the starred axioms
are either modified axioms of PresbAr or new axioms.
Let us comment on new axioms. By providing somemodels wewill show their addition is necessary. If wewould remove
A9∗ from slPresbAr then we could take as a model for slPresbAr \ {A9∗} any nonstandard model for Presburger arithmetic
where MAX denotes a nonstandard element. But such a model does not have a maximal element so it cannot be a model of
sl(A).
If, for some i ≥ 2, we replace A11∗i by its negation then, by A9∗, for each j ≥ i, the negation of A11∗j follows. The unique
model of such a theory is a model from FM(A)with the universe {0, . . . , i}. But sl(A) has no finite models.
To see that the axiom A10∗ is really needed we should take a closer look at the structure of a nonstandard countable
model for PresbAr. One such modelM |H PresbAr may be defined as follows.
Let Z be the set of integers and let Q+ be the set of strictly positive rational numbers. The universe UM ofM is the set of
pairs (N× {0}) ∪ (Z× Q+). The addition is defined as
(n, q)+M (m, r) = (n+m, q+ r).
It is easy to see that the ordering ofM can be described as
(n, q) ≤ (m, r) if and only if q < r ∨ (q = r ∧ n ≤ m).
We define fromM a modelM′ for slPresbAr with A10∗ replaced by its negation. The universe UM′ ofM′ is the universe of
M restricted to pairs (n, q)with q < 1 with one additional element which we call Top. It will be a maximal element ofM′.
The addition ofM′ is defined as
(n, q)+M′ (m, r) =

(n, q)+M (m, r) if (n, q)+M (m, r) ∈ UM′ ,
Top otherwise.
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When one of the arguments of a+M′ b is Top, the result is always Top. It is easy to check thatM′ satisfies all the axioms of
slPresbAr but A10∗. Indeed, the element Top has no predecessor because UM′ \ {Top} is closed under successor.
With the above examples we see that presented changes and additions to PresbAr were necessary in order to describe
properly sl(A). In the remaining part of this section we prove that slPresbAr is indeed an axiomatization of slPresbAr.
We will state some basic facts about models of slPresbAr.
Fact 5.2. LetM |H slPresbAr. The formula ∃z(x+ z = y) defines inM a linear ordering. The interpretation of the constantMAX
inM is the greatest element in this ordering.
Proof. Transitivity follows from A2, totality from A5. To prove that the defined order is antisymmetric one should use A3∗,
A2, A6 and A9∗. Assuming that x+ z = y and y+ z ′ = x, we should consider two cases. If x = MAX then, by A9∗, y = MAX.
Otherwise x+ (z + z ′) = x = x+ 0 and, by A3∗ and A6, z = z ′ = 0. So, x = y.
Using A9∗ we prove that MAX is a maximal element of this order. 
Fact 5.3. LetM |H slPresbAr. Then, there exists inM exactly one predecessor of MAX, i.e., an element a such thatM |H x ≠
MAX ∧ x+ 1 = MAX[a].
Proof. Let m be a maximal element ofM. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that for some a, b we have a + 1 =
b+ 1 = m, a ≠ m, b ≠ m and a ≠ b. Then there exists z ≠ 0 such that a+ z = b or b+ z = a. Let us assume that a+ z = b.
The element z is not equal to m since b is not, otherwise we would have b = a + z = a + m = m. Thus, we may prove
exactly as in the case of PresbAr, that there exists z ′ such that z = z ′ + 1. But then b = a+ z = a+ z ′ + 1 = m+ z ′ = m
what contradicts b ≠ m. 
Let us remind that in each modelM |H slPresbAr, we haveM |H MAX+1 = MAX. However, the maximal element ofM
is not its own predecessor. From the above fact it can be easily inferred that the following formula is provable in slPresbAr:
∀x(x ≠ 0⇒ ∃y(y ≠ x ∧ x = y+ 1)).
Now,we give someuseful examples of sentences in sl(A). Let us note that all these sentences can be deduced in slPresbAr.
Examples. 5.1. Let |x| be the absolute value of x. The correctness of the operations |x − y|, for arguments below MAX, can
be proven in slPresbAr. The following sentence is provable:
∀x < MAX∀y < MAX[∃=1z(x+ z = y ∨ y+ z = x) ∧ ∀z((x+ z = y ∨ y+ z = x)⇒ z < MAX)].
By |x− y|we will denote the unique z which satisfies (x+ z = y ∨ y+ z = x).
5.2. As we noted, for every n > 1, the formula x ≡n y defines a congruence relation in a model for PresbAr. But it is not true
in the case of the model for sl(A) because for every n > 1, the sentence ∀x(MAX ≡n x) belongs to sl(A). For n, i ∈ N, n > 1
and i ≥ 1 by MAX ≡∗n iwe denote the following sentence
∃x(MAX = x+ · · · + x  
n
+ 1+ · · · + 1  
i
∧MAX ≠ x+ · · · + x  
n
+ 1+ · · · + 1  
i−1
).
Similarly, for n > 1 by MAX ≡∗n 0 we denote the following sentence
∃x(MAX = (x+ 1) · · · + (x+ 1)  
n
∧MAX ≠ (x+ 1)+ · · · + (x+ 1)  
n−1
+ x).
For arbitrarym, n > 1 and i ∈ N the sentence MAX ≡∗n i is true inAm if and only ifm ≡n i. So, MAX ≡∗n i ∉ sl(A). However,
for arbitrary i, j, n ∈ N if i, j < n and i ≠ j, the sentence MAX ≡∗n i ⇒ ¬MAX ≡∗n j is provable in slPresbAr.
In the next subsection we prove the completeness of a given axiomatization slPresbAr with respect to sl(A). In order to
do so, we need the following technical lemma. It states some maximality/minimality principles. In PresbAr they are easily
provable afterwe have an elimination of quantifiers. In slPresbArwe need these principles to establish a relation of slPresbAr
to PresbAr and to prove a quantifier elimination for slPresbAr.
Lemma 5.4. The following is provable in slPresbAr:
1. ∀ x < MAX ∃z(x+ z = MAX ∧ ∀t < z(x+ t ≠ MAX)),
2.
∀x < MAX∀y < MAX (x+ y = MAX⇒
∃z < MAX [z < y ∧ x+ |y− z| = MAX) ∧ ∀t > z(x+ |y− t| ≠ MAX)].
Proof. The first point of the lemma is a certain minimum principle while the second one is a maximum principle. To prove
the first point let us take y < MAX such that y+ 1 = MAX. Then, x ≤ y and let t = |y− x|. We claim that t + 1 is a minimal
z such that x + z = MAX. Indeed, x + (t + 1) = y + 1 = MAX. Now, let us assume that w < t + 1. Then, w ≤ t and, in
consequence, x+ w ≤ x+ t = y < MAX.
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To prove the second point let us take, by the first point, a minimal w such that x + w = MAX. Then, w ≤ y and there
exists a unique z ≤ y such that |y− z| = w. By minimality ofw this z is maximal with the property x+ |y− z| = MAX.
Since x < MAX, |y− z| ≠ 0. It follows that z cannot be equal to y, so z < y. 
5.3. Model theoretical characterization of sl((N,+))
As we noted (see Example 5.2) the theory sl(A) is not complete. So, it has at least two (indeed even continuum many)
not elementarily equivalent models. In this subsection we give a full characterization of these models showing their close
relation with models for Presburger arithmetic. This characterization proves slPresbAr to be an axiomatization of sl(A) and
gives a full description of complete extensions of slPresbAr.
In establishing a relation between PresbAr and slPresbAr we use the method of interpretation, for a detailed description
of the method we refer to [6]. A theory T1 is interpretable in a theory T2 if every predicate, function symbol and constant of
the language of T1 is definable in T2 in such a way that for every sentence ϕ of the language of T1 and its natural translation
ϕ∗ in the language of T2 the following equivalence holds:
T1 |H ϕ if and only if T2 |H ϕ∗.
The translation replaces every symbol of T1 by its definition in T2. Moreover, in the interpretation we may also restrict the
universe. If the formula defining the universe of T1 is ϕU(x), then, in the translation, we relativize each quantifier to the
formula ϕU(x), e.g., ∀yψ(y) is translated to ∀y(ϕU(y)⇒ ψ∗(y)). We say that theories T1 and T2 are mutually interpretable if
T1 is interpretable in T2 and T2 is interpretable in T1.
We may also say that a model M1 is interpretable in a model M2. This is understood as a statement about theories
T1 = Th(M1) and T2 = Th(M2). Obviously, in this caseM1 |H ϕ if and only ifM2 |H ϕ∗.
It will be useful for us to consider also Presburger arithmetic in a relational signature: the theory of the structure
B = (N, R+), where R+ is a graph of the addition operation from the standard model A of Presburger arithmetic:
R+ = {(n,m, k) ∈ N3 : n+m = k}.
It is clear that the relation R+ can be defined in A and that the addition operation can be defined in B. So, theories of
structures A and B are mutually interpretable. Moreover, all results concerning the theory of the structure A stated in
Section 5.1 can be repeated with some natural reformulation in the case of the theory of B. It is natural to ask if the same
holds for theories sl(A) and sl(B). In this case the natural translation does not work. To see this it is enough to observe that
the atomic sentence MAX+MAX = MAX belongs to sl(A) but the atomic sentence R(MAX,MAX,MAX) does not belong to
sl(B). Nevertheless, we can prove the following.
Proposition 5.5. Theories sl(A) and sl(B) are mutually interpretable. Moreover, there are formulas ϕ+(x, y, z) and ϕR+(x, y, z)
such that for each n ∈ N, ϕ+(x, y, z) defines in Bn a graph of a function from An and ϕR+(x, y, z) defines in An a restriction of
R+ to the universe ofBn.
Proof. As formulas ϕ+ and ϕR+ we can take the following formulas:
ϕ+(x, y, z) := R+(x, y, z) ∨ (z = MAX ∧ ∃t < yR+(x, t,MAX)).
ϕR+(x, y, z) := [x+ y = z ∧ (z ≠ MAX ∨ x = 0 ∨ y = 0)]∨ [z = MAX ∧ x ≠ 0 ∧ y ≠ 0 ∧ ∀u(u < x ⇒ u+ y ≠ MAX)].
It is not difficult to verify that for each n ∈ N the above definitions define in structuresAn andBn the needed relation and
function, respectively. Thus, using these definitions we show the mutual interpretability of theories sl(A) and sl(B). 
It follows from the above proposition that each notion definable in the theory sl(A) is definable in sl(B) and conversely.
For example, a linear ordering definable in sl(A) is also definable in sl(B). In what follows, for a given model of sl(A) we
take as its relational counterpart the model defined in it by ϕR+(x, y, z).
Now, we will show that every model of sl(B) is, in some strong sense, a submodel of a model of Presburger arithmetic.
Definition 5.6. LetM′ be a linearly ordered structure by an ordering ≤ and letM be its substructure. If a universe ofM is
an initial segment of the universe ofM′ with respect to≤ then we say thatM′ is an end extension ofM. We denote this by
M ⊆e M′.
We extend this notion also to a case whenM is in a relational vocabulary andM′ is in a functional vocabulary. Then,
M ⊆e M′ if the universe of M is an initial segment of the universe of M′ and relations from M are restrictions to the
universe ofM of corresponding functions fromM′.
In the next theoremwe show that models of slPresbAr are always initial segments with a maximal element of models of
PresbAr.
Theorem 5.7. Let M = (M,⊕,m) be a model of slPresbAr and let M1 = (M, S⊕,m) be its counterpart in the relational
vocabulary. Then there is a model for PresbArM′ = (M ′,⊘) such that (M, S⊕) ⊆e M′.
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Proof. LetM = (M,⊕,m) andM1 = (M, S⊕,m) satisfy assumptions of the theorem. We put M ′ = {(i, a) : i ∈ N, a ∈
M, a ≠ m} and define a binary operation⊘ onM ′ as follows:
(i, a)⊘ (j, b) =

(i+ j, a⊕ b) if a⊕ b < m,
(i+ j+ 1,max{x : x < b ∧ a⊕ |b− x| = m}) if a⊕ b = m.
The correctness of the above definition is assured by point 2 of Lemma 5.4 where the existence of the maximal x is proved.
The function h such that h(a) = (0, a) for a ∈ M − {m} and h(m) = (1, 0) defines the needed injection of M into
M′ = (M ′,⊘). Now, we should show that such a defined structure M′ is a model for PresbAr. This is done by a simple
verification that each axiom of PresbAr is true inM′. This verification goes in a uniform way so we present only the case of
Axiom A3.
First, we observe that there is a formula in the language of sl(A) which defines inM an operation ⊘˜:M2×M2 −→ M2
such that whenever i, j ∈ N,
(i, a)⊘ (j, b) = (i, a) ⊘˜ (j, b).
Since for natural numbers⊕ agrees, provably in slPresbAr, with the usual addition operation+, to define ⊘˜ it is enough to
take a formula which describes the operation⊘ but uses⊕ instead of+ and has the following form:
(i, a)⊘˜(j, b) =

(i⊕ j, a⊕ b) if a⊕ b < m,
(i⊕ j⊕ 1,max{x : x < b ∧ a⊕ |b− x| = m}) if a⊕ b = m.
Obviously, all the involved notions are definable. In particular for |x − y| = z we may take the formula from Example 5.1.
Let us remind that, by the definition ofM ′, we are interested only in cases when a, b < MAX.
Now, we observe that the following sentence is provable in slPresbAr
∀u < MAX
3
∀v < MAX
3
∀w < MAX
3
∀x∀y∀z((u, x) ⊘˜ (w, z) = (v, y) ⊘˜ (w, z)⇒ (u, x) = (v, y)),
where x < y3 is read as x + x + x < y. Indeed, to verify this we need only basic properties of addition and the condition
u, v, w < MAX/3 is to ensure that u + v + 1, u + w + 1 < MAX so that a result of ⊘˜ will not reach MAX in the first
component of ordered pairs.
For n ∈ N, let n be the closed term 1+ · · · + 1  
n times
which denotes n. Since for each n ∈ N, slPresbAr proves n < MAX/3, we
have that for arbitrary i, j, k ∈ N the sentence
∀xyz((i, x) ⊘˜ (k, z) = (j, y) ⊘˜ (k, z)→ (i, x) = (j, y)),
is provable in slPresbAr. Then, the above sentence is true inM and, in consequence, Axiom A3 is true inM′. A verification
of other axioms of PresbAr goes in a similar way. 
Below, we prove that slPresbAr is an axiomatization of sl(A) just as PresbAr is an axiomatization ofA. Before we do this,
we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8. LetM |H sl(A), letmbe itsmaximal element and letM′ |H PresbAr be its end extension. There is an interpretation of
M inM′ which usesm as a parameter. Moreover, if instead ofmwe take as a parameter a natural number n then the interpretation
defines the nth model from FM(A).
Proof. LetM = (M,⊕,m) be a model of slPresbAr and letM′ = (M ′,+) |H PresbAr be its end extension which exists
by Theorem 5.7. The operation ⊕ is definable in M′ with a parameter m. Indeed as a definition we can take a formula
ψ⊕(x, y, z, p)
(x+ y = z ∧ z < p) ∨ (x+ y ≥ p ∧ z = p),
where p is interpreted by m. The universe ofM is defined by the formula ψU(x, p) = x ≤ p. Moreover, if we interpret p by
n ∈ N, the above formulas define inM a modelAn ∈ FM(A) . As usual, the translation ϕ∗(x¯, p) is given by replacing⊕ by
ψ⊕, its definition inM, replacing MAX by p and by restricting all quantifiers to ψU . 
In what follows we will use the above translation of a given formula ϕ(x¯) into a formula ϕ∗(x¯, p). The free variable pwill
be valued by the maximal element of an interpreted modelM |H slPresbAr. We will need the fact that, by the properties of
the interpretation,
M |H ϕ ⇐⇒ M′ |H ϕ∗(p)[m/p],
wherem is the maximal element ofM andM′ is its end extension satisfying PresbAr.
Theorem 5.9. sl(A) = Cn(slPresbAr).
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Proof. Since each axiom of slPresbAr is true in all sufficiently large models from FM(A)we have Cn(slPresbAr) ⊆ sl(A).
For the other inclusion let us assume that a given sentence ϕ is not a consequence of slPresbAr. We will show that ¬ϕ
holds in infinitely many models from FM(A), thus ϕ ∉ sl(A).
LetM = (M,⊕,m) be a model of slPresbAr and¬ϕ. By Theorem 5.7 there is a modelM′ = (M ′,+) of PresbAr which is
an end extension of a relational counterpart ofM. Now, by the properties of translation ∗
(a) M |H ¬ϕ if and only ifM′ |H (¬ϕ)∗[m/p],
(b) for each n ∈ N,An |H ¬ϕ if and only ifA |H (¬ϕ)∗[n/p].
From (a) we may infer that M′ |H (¬ϕ)∗[m/p]. Thus, M′ |H ∃p ≥ k (¬ϕ)∗, for each k ∈ N, where k denotes the term
1+ · · · + 1  
k
. But sinceM′ |H PresbAr andPresbAr is a complete theory, it follows that for all k ∈ N, the sentence∃p ≥ k(¬ϕ)∗
is provable from PresbAr. Then, for each k ∈ N,A |H ∃p ≥ k(¬ϕ)∗. Next, using (b), we obtain that there are arbitrary large
finite modelsAn ∈ FM(A) such thatAn |H ¬ϕ. This ends the proof of the theorem. 
From the last corollary it follows that the set of sentences sl(A) is recursively enumerable. Moreover, the theory sl(A) is
decidable (see [13], Corollary 3.3).
Using Theorem 5.7 we can also characterize complete extensions of slPresbAr. We show that every complete extension
of slPresbAr is completely characterized by sentences of the form MAX ≡∗n i.
Theorem 5.10. Let T be a complete extension of slPresbAr and letΘ = {MAX ≡∗n i : i, n ∈ N}∩T . Then, T = Cn(slPresbAr∪Θ).
Proof. Obviously Cn(slPresbAr ∪ Θ) ⊆ T . To prove the other inclusion it is enough to show that Cn(slPresbAr ∪ Θ) is a
complete theory. To this end, we show that any two models of slPresbAr ∪Θ agree on any sentence.
LetMi = (Mi,⊕i,mi), for i ∈ {1, 2}, be a model for slPresbAr ∪ Θ and let ϕ be an arbitrary sentence. We need to prove
that
M1 |H ϕ if and only if M2 |H ϕ. (1)
For i ∈ {1, 2}, letM′i |H PresbAr be an end extension of a relational counterpart ofMi. Then, using the translation ∗,
Mi |H ϕ if and only if M′i |H ϕ∗[mi/p]. (2)
By the elimination of quantifiers in PresbAr, there exists a boolean combination of atomic formulas η(p) with only one
free variable p such that ϕ∗(p) is equivalent in AxPresbAr to η(p). Since p is the only free variable of η, the basic atomic
formulas after quantifier elimination (see a comment after Theorem 5.1) reduce to five types:
(a) formulas with only constant terms
(b) p+ · · · + p  
n
+ t = u,
(c) p+ · · · + p  
n
+ t ≤ u,
(d) u < p+ · · · + p  
n
+ t ,
(e) p+ · · · + p  
n
+ t ≡k u,
where n and k are natural numbers and t and u are constant terms built using constants 0 and 1.
Now, truth values of formulas of type (a) are decided by PresbAr. Then, since m1 and m2 are nonstandard numbers, all
formulas of types (b) or (c) are false inM′1 andM
′
2 and all formulas of type (d) are true. Finally all formulas of type (e) are
decided byΘ and sinceM′1 andM
′
2 agree onΘ they decide formulas of this type in the same way. Thus,
M′1 |H ϕ∗[m1/x] if and only if M′2 |H ϕ∗[m2/x]. (3)
Equivalence (1) follows directly from (2) and (3). This ends the proof of the theorem. 
Now, we are able to conclude that sl(A) has as many complete extensions as possible. Let (pn)n∈N be the sequence of all
prime numbers, let P = {pn : n ∈ N} and let f : P −→ N with f (pn) < pn. For such an f we denote by θ fpn the following
sentence MAX ≡∗pn f (pn) and we put Tf = {θ fpn : n ∈ N}.
Fact 5.11. Let f : P −→ N be a function such that, for every n ∈ N, f (pn) < pn. Then sl(A) ∪ Tf is a consistent set of sentences.
Proof. We define a sequence of natural numbers (mk)k∈N inductively as follows: m0 = 0, mk+1 = min{m : m > mk and,
for all j ≤ k,m ≡pj f (pj)}. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem the sequence (mk)k∈N is well defined. Let X = {mk : k ∈ N}.
Using the definition of the sequence (mk)k∈N it is easy to verify that Tf ⊆ slX (A). Thus, sl(A) ∪ Tf is a consistent set of
sentences. 
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There is a continuummany functions satisfying the assumption of Fact 5.11. Obviously for two different functions f and
g the set of sentences sl(A) ∪ Tf ∪ Tg is inconsistent. Thus we have
Corollary 5.12. sl(A) has a continuum of complete extensions.
Now, we can deduce that it has infinitely many decidable extensions.
Corollary 5.13. There are infinitely many complete and decidable extensions of sl(A).
Proof. Let f : P −→ N be a recursive function such that, for every n ∈ N, f (pn) < pn. Let us note that there exist infinitely
many such functions. Now, we use a version of the Chinese Remainder Theorem. It states that for every two finite sequences
of natural numbers a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bk such that for i = 1, . . . , k, bi < ai and, for i ≠ j, ai and aj are relatively prime
there exists exactly one number r <
∏
i≤k ai such that for i = 1, . . . , k, r ≡ai bi.
Obviously, this unique number r can be found in an effective way. Let us denote this number by ra1,...,akb1,...,bk .
Now, we extend f to a recursive function f ∗ : (N− {0, 1}) −→ N so that the theory
T = slPresbAr ∪ {MAX ≡∗n f ∗(n) : n ∈ N− {0, 1}}
will be consistent. For powers of primes we put f ∗(pαi ) = f (pi). The consistency of slPresbAr ∪ {MAX ≡∗pαi f
∗(pαi ) : i ∈
N∧α ∈ N−{0}} is assured by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Indeed, for any finite set of the above congruency conditions
there are arbitrarily large finite numbers which satisfy them as MAX. Now, by the uniqueness of r in the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, there is the unique way in which we can extended f ∗ to arbitrary n ∈ N− {0, 1}:
if n = pα00 . . . pαkk then f ∗(n) = r
p
α0
s0 ,...,p
αk
k
f (ps0 ),...,f (psk )
.
The function f ∗ is recursive. Moreover, if f1 ≠ f2 then f ∗1 ≠ f ∗2 . By Theorem 5.10, the theory T is a recursive axiomatization
of a complete extension of sl(A). Hence this complete extension is decidable. 
As we showed in Theorem 5.7, each model for sl(A) can be extended to a model of PresbAr. This means that each model
of sl(A) is an initial segment of amodel of PresbAr. Now, as a consequence of Theorem5.9wewill show something converse.
Namely, we will show that each infinite initial segment with a maximal element of a model of PresbAr is a model for sl(A).
Theorem 5.14. LetM = (M,⊕) be a nonstandard model for PresbAr and a ∈ |M| be a nonstandard element. Let Ma = {x ∈
M : x ≤M a} and a function⊘ : Ma ×Ma → Ma be defined as follows
x⊘ y =

x⊕ y if x⊕ y ≤M a
a if x⊕ y >M a.
ThenMa = (Ma,⊘, a) is a model for sl(A).
Proof. LetM, a andMa be as in the assumption of the theorem. SinceM |H PresbAr and a is nonstandard, it is routine to
verify that each axiom of slPresbAr is true inMa. By Theorem 5.9,Ma is a model of sl(A). 
6. Theory of addition and multiplication in finite models
6.1. Definability in models for sl(N )
Now, we will consider the standard model of arithmetic N = (N,+, ·, 0, 1). We will show that there is a formula ϕ(x)
such that it can represent any subset of N, in some complete extension of sl(N ). We can think about ϕ as a formula which
is undetermined for any a ∈ N.
Let us note that a similar result holds for Peano arithmetic PA. A formula ϕ(x) is flexible over PA if for each function
ε : N −→ {0, 1} the following theory is consistent
PA ∪ {ϕ(n) : n ∈ N and ε(n) = 1} ∪ {¬ϕ(n) : n ∈ N and ε(n) = 0}.
Then, it can be proved that there exists a flexible formula over PA (see Theorem 2.15 from Chapter III of [7]).
We need the following definition.
Definition 6.1. The 2-ary pairing function, ⟨., .⟩2 : N2 −→ N, is defined as ⟨x, y⟩2 = (x+y)(x+y+1)2 +y. It is a bijection between
N2 and N.
By induction, we define a d-ary function for d ≥ 3. If ⟨. . .⟩d : Nd −→ N is defined then ⟨. . .⟩d+1 : Nd+1 −→ N is defined
as
⟨x1, . . . , xd+1⟩d+1 = ⟨x1, ⟨x2, . . . , xd+1⟩d⟩2.
Usually the index dwill be omitted.
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Let us recall that an arithmetical formula ϕ is ∆0 if each quantifier in ϕ is bounded. Then, for each d, the graph of the
function ⟨. . .⟩d is ∆0 definable. It follows that we can define the proper restriction of its graph in each finite model from
FM(N ).
Theorem 6.2. There exists a formula ϕ(x) such that for each A ⊆ N there is an ultrafilterU such that
A = {a ∈ N : Πn∈NNn/U |H ϕ[a]},
where a is the equivalence class of the function
fa(i) =

0 if i < a,
a otherwise.
Proof. To start with, we will define the family of sets {Xi}i∈N such that
• Xi ⊆ N,
• for each sequence n1, . . . , nk+m of pairwise distinct integers
1≤i≤k
Xni ∩

1≤i≤m
(N− Xnk+i)
is infinite.
We take
Xi = {x : ∃z1 ≤ x∃z2 ≤ x(x = ⟨z1ppi+1i+1 , z2⟩)},
where pk is the kth prime number. To see that {Xi}i∈ω has the desired properties let n1, . . . , nk+m be a sequence of pairwise
different integers. Then

1≤i≤k Xni ∩

1≤i≤m(N − Xnk+i) contains each number ⟨Πi≤kp
pni
ni , y⟩. This property of the family
{Xi}i∈N guarantees that for each ε : N −→ {0, 1} the family {Xε(i)i }i∈N, where
Xai =

Xi if a = 1,
N− Xi if a = 0,
will have the finite intersection property. Consequently, there will be an ultrafilter in which this family is contained.
By Pr(x, y)wewill denote the functional relation y = ppxx . This relation is∆0 definable so its graph is uniformly definable
in each finite model Ni. It is not known whether the relation ‘‘y is the xth prime’’ is ∆0. However, we can∆0 ‘‘compute’’ px
in Pr(x, y) using y as a bound for quantifiers.
Let ϕ′(x, y) be a formula which defines in each model from FM(N ) the following relation
∃z∃z1∃z2(Pr(x+ 1, z) ∧ y = ⟨z1z, z2⟩).
Then, as ϕ(x)we take ϕ′(x,MAX). Let us observe that, for i ∈ N, Xi = {k ∈ N : Nk |H ϕ[i]}.
Now we will show that ϕ satisfies the assertion of the theorem. Let A ⊆ N and let ξA : N −→ {0, 1} be the characteristic
function of A,
ξA(i) =

1 if i ∈ A,
0 otherwise.
Then there exists a non-principal ultrafilter U containing the family {X ξA(i)i }i∈N constructed from this ξA. For proving the
theorem one should observe that the following are equivalent for each a ∈ N,
a ∈ A ⇐⇒ X ξA(a)a ∈ U
⇐⇒ {k : Nk |H ϕ[a]} ∈ U
⇐⇒ Πi∈NNi/U |H ϕ[[fa]]. 
Theorem 6.2 also allows us to show that there is as many complete extensions of sl(N ) as possible.
Corollary 6.3. There is a continuum of complete, consistent extensions of sl(N ).
Proof. Let ϕ be as in Theorem 6.2. Then for each X ⊆ N, there is an ultrafilter UX such that ϕ defines X in Πn∈NNn/UX .
Of course, for different X, Y ⊆ N, theories of models AX = Πn∈NNn/UX and AY = Πn∈NNn/UY are different because ϕ
defines X inAX and Y inAY . So, we have a continuum of different theories TX = Th(AX ). 
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Let us observe that the above corollary follows also from Corollary 5.12.
6.2. Complexity of complete extensions of sl(N )
In Section 4 we have shown that for any A and for any recursive, and complete extension T of sl(A) one can find a
recursive X such that T = slX (A) (see Corollary 4.3). In this section we show that if we consider the modelN = (N,+,×)
then the complexity of X such that slX (N ) is a complete theory is notΣ1 in the arithmetical hierarchy and that any complete
extension is at least∆3.
Let us recall that an arithmetical formula is∆n, for n > 0, if it is equivalent inN toΣn andΠn formulas. An arithmetical
relation is∆n if it definable inN by a∆n formula.
In this section we describe the complexity of theories in terms of arithmetical hierarchy of sets. This hierarchy describes
the complexity of subsets of natural numbers. Thus,we assume that somenatural coding of formulas as numbers is implicitly
given. Under this coding we can think about various sets of formulas as subsets of natural numbers. The details of such a
coding will not be important for us. To see some examples of such codings one can consult e.g. [7].
The following is a well known fact.
Fact 6.4. For any complete theory T and for any n, if T ∈ Σn, then T ∈ ∆n.
The proof of the following fact uses essentially the Tarski method of undefinability of truth adapted to finite models by
Mostowski in [17]. Indeed, a case for X = N is proved there with the same proof.
Fact 6.5. For any infinite X ⊆ N, slX (N ) ∉ ∆2.
Proof. Assume that slX (N ) ∈ ∆2. All sets which are ∆2 are FM-representable in FM(A). It follows that they are
representable in any extension of sl(N ). However, if such an extension is∆2, then it would define the truth for itself, which
is impossible by the Tarski theorem (see [17] for details on the truth definitions for theories of the form sl(A)). 
Fact 6.5 together with Theorem 4.2 shows that sl(N ) is essentially undecidable, i.e., sl(N ) is undecidable and its every
extension is also undecidable.
By Facts 6.4 and 6.5 we have the following conclusion.
Corollary 6.6. The complexity of any complete extension of sl(N ) is at least∆3.
Then, from the definition of the relation ‘‘ϕ belongs to slX (A)’’ we easily get the following.
Fact 6.7. If X ⊆ N is such that slX (N ) is a complete theory, then X ∉ Σ1.
6.3. An example
Now,wewill construct an example of a complete extension T of sl(N )which is indeed∆3. Moreover, T is equal to slX (A)
for X ∈ Π1. Thus, we show that Corollary 6.6 and Fact 6.7 are optimal. Let {ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, . . .} be a recursive enumeration of all
sentences in our language with ϕ0 being a tautology and let D be a full binary tree labeled in the following way:
ϕ0
vmmm
mmm
mmm
mmm
mmm
(QQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQ
¬ϕ1
!C
CC
CC
CC
C
|yy
yy
yy
yy
ϕ1
}{{
{{
{{
{{
 A
AA
AA
AA
A
¬ϕ2
|xx
xx
xx
xx

ϕ2
|xx
xx
xx
xx
x

¬ϕ2
|xx
xx
xx
xx

ϕ2
|zz
zz
zz
zz
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
We describe a function F which on input i returns a sequence (ψ0, . . . , ψi), an initial fragment of the leftmost path in D
which forms a complete theory consistentwith sl(N ). The function uses aΣ2-complete oracle sl(N ). Having such a function
one can easily see that the complexity of this path is∆3. The function uses a variable P which, at the end, is the output path
and uses some additional variables like γ which is a conjunction of sentences on the path constructed so far. Below, there
is a description of an algorithm computing F . We use the notation P⌢(a) for the operation of extending the sequence P by
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an element a.
input : n
P := ∅; γ := ϕ0; i := 0;
while (i < n) {
i := i+ 1;
if pγ ⇒ ϕiq ∈ sl(N ) then {
P := P⌢(ϕi);
γ := γ ∧ ϕi;
}
else {
P := P⌢(¬ϕi);
γ := γ ∧ ¬ϕi;
}
}
output : P
Since the oracle is Σ2 the constructed function is ∆3. But now, if we want to check whether ϕi belongs to the leftmost
path in Dwhich is consistent with sl(N )we need only to check whether ϕi is on the output path on the input i. This proves
that the complexity of this path is ∆3. We call the constructed theory T ∗. In what follows, we will show that T ∗ = slX (N )
for some X ∈ Π1.
Let ≼l and ≺l be the lexicographic ordering and its strict version on the 0–1 sequences and let (¬)0ϕ and (¬)1ϕ be ¬ϕ
and ϕ, respectively. Then, we say that a 0–1 sequence (a0, . . . , ai) is realized in a modelA ∈ FM(N ) ifA |Hj≤i(¬)ajϕj.
We define a relation R such that for all i, k ∈ N,
(i, k) ∈ R ⇐⇒ 2i+1 < k and ∃(a0, . . . , ai) ∈ {0, 1}i+1

Nk |Hj≤i(¬)ajϕj and
∃(b0, . . . , bi) ≺l (a0, . . . , ai)Nk−1 |Hj≤i(¬)bjϕj and
∀w ≥ k∀(b0, . . . , bi) ≺l (a0, . . . , ai)Nw |̸Hj≤i(¬)bjϕj.
A pair (i, k) is in R if k is the least r > 2i+1 such thatNr |Hj≤i(¬)ajϕj for a minimal (a0, . . . , ai)which is realized in some
modelNw ∈ FM(N ), forw ≥ r .
All quantifiers in the above definition but∀w ≥ k can bewritten as boundedquantifiers. Thus, thewhole defining formula
can be written in aΠ1 form and the relation R isΠ1 in the arithmetical hierarchy. Consequently, the following definition of
the set X can be written as aΠ1 formula: for all k ∈ N,
k ∈ X ⇐⇒ ∃i ≤ k (i, k) ∈ R.
Now, let us argue that slX (N ) = T ∗. Let (c0, . . . , cn) be an initial segment of the path which determines T ∗. Thus,
(c0, . . . , cn) is realized infinitely often in FM(N ). For each (b0, . . . , bn) ≺l (c0, . . . , cn), (b0, . . . , bn) is realized only finitely
many times (because the conjunction

0≤i≤n(¬)biϕi is inconsistent with sl(N )). So, let k(n) be such that no (b0, . . . , bn) ≺l
(c0, . . . , cn) is realized in Nw , for w ≥ k(n). Then, for all (i, k) ∈ R, with i ≥ k(n), if (a0, . . . , ai) is a witness for minimal
0–1 sequence in the definition of R, then (c0, . . . , cn) forms an initial segment of (a0, . . . , ai). It follows that Nk realizes
(c0, . . . , cn) and, by the definition of X ,
∀k ≥ max{2n+1, k(n)}

k ∈ X ⇒ Nk |H

j≤n
(¬)cjϕj

.
Therefore, slX (N ) = T ∗.
7. Final remarks
In this paper we examine the arithmetic from the finite models’ viewpoint which, as we believe, describes better a real
computer-like arithmetic. We consider properties of finite initial segments of the standard models for arithmetics and their
theories. Since, theories of the form sl(A) are usually not complete, we are interested in characterizing complete extensions
of these theories. We focus our attention on two arithmetics—Presburger arithmetic, i.e., the arithmetic of addition, and
the arithmetic of addition and multiplication, the so-called full arithmetic. We prove in particular that sl-theories of these
arithmetics have continuum many complete extensions. In the case of Presburger arithmetic we give axiomatizations of
sl((N,+)) and its complete extensions (see Theorems 5.9 and 5.10). Moreover, we show a close relation between models
for sl((N,+)) and nonstandard models for Presburger arithmetic (Theorems 5.7 and 5.14).
In the case of full arithmetic one can observe that each complete extension of sl((N,+,×)) is at least∆3. Consequently
we construct a complete extension T of the complexity∆3 and we find aΠ1 set X such that T = slX (N ).
The above results are formulated for arithmetic with addition and/or multiplication. However, by the interpretation of
sl((N,+,×)) in sl((N,×)) (see [13]) the same results can be deduced for arithmetic with multiplication only or even only
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with the coprimality relation (see [19] for a finite model interpretation of addition and multiplication using the coprimality
relation).
In this paper all the considered structures have a definable linear ordering. In such a casewe can consider a family of finite
initial segments of such an ordered structure in order to define the sl-theory of the structure. It is natural, however, to extend
this approach to the case of an arbitrary infinite countable structure and consider instead a family of its finite substructures.
One can remark that similar results on sl-theories can be obtained in thismore general case.Wedo not develop this approach
since it has more general, model theoretical character while we are concentrated here on arithmetical structures only, since
they are of fundamental interest for the science of digital computing.
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